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WEST YIIGINIA LA W QUAITEILY
ally a city or county, is made defendant in a suit where liability is
based on alleged acceptance of a dedication. In such cases the
courts by a great majority say that public user alone will not bind
the dedicatee.27
The reason for the strictness of the West Virginia Supreme
Court in determining what constitutes an acceptance of a dedica-
tion, and its opposition to public user as an acceptance, is found
in the statute imposing absolute liability on a county or munici-
pality for injury by reason of a public road being out of repai?,28
and the definition given in our statutes to the words "road and
street." 29
-R. J. R.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-INJUNCTION TO STAY WAsTE.-The ten-
ant in possession under a one year lease let out a part of the
demised premises, a farm, to striking miners for a tent colony. The
miners erected tents, frame houses of a temporary nature, dug
holes, ditches and drains through the meadowland. The lessor
filed his bill in equity against the lessee for an injunction, one of
the grounds for relief being that the lessee and those under him
were committing waste. The lower court granted the injunction.
It appears that the waste complained of was not irreparable and
of a substantial or permanent nature. Upon appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed the decree of the lower court, holding, inter alia,
that in a suit by the lessor to restrain the lessee from committing
waste on the demised premises the bill must aver facts sufficient
to show that the injury is irreparable by an action at law. Gwinn
v. Rogers, 115 S. E. 428, (W. Va. 1923).
The Court cites as authority for this holding the case of Great-
house v. Greathouse, 46 W. Va. 21. In that case the Court refused
to restrain the life tenant from committing waste on the ground
that the waste proven was trivial and capable of pecuniary com-
pensation; that the injury must be substantial and irreparable in
order to give equity jurisdiction and authority to grant an injunc-
-1 Downing v. Coatesville Borough, 214 Pa. 291, 63 Atl. 696 (1906); Road Dist.
No. 1 v. Beebe, 213 Ill. 147, 83 N. E. 131 (1907) ; Michaelson v. Charleston. 71 W.
Va. 35, 75 S. E. 151 (1912) ; Host v. Piedmont etc. Ry Co., supra. Contra, State v.
Birmingham, 74 Ia. 407, 38 N. W. 121 (1888).
'2 W. VA. CODE, c. 43 § 154.
29 Talbott v. King, 32 W. Va. 6, 9 S. E. 48 (1889).
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tion. That case cites as authority for so holding: McMillan v. Fer-
rell, 7 W. Va. 223; Cox v. Douglass, 20 W. Va. 175; Watson v. Fer-
rell, 34 W. Va. 406; Bettman v. Harness, 42 W. Va. 433. An exam-
ination of these cases reveal that the relation of the parties is not
that of landlord and tenant, or that they stand in any privity of
title, but are cases where the title is in dispute and consequently
are cases involving trespass. Historically, there is a fundamental
distinction between the use of an injunction to stay waste by a ten-
ant and an injunction to restrain trespass. Originally the injunc-
tion was granted only upon the petition of the owner of the rever-
sion to stay waste by the tenant in possession. Later, to afford
relief in cases of trespass where the injury was irreparable, and
consequently there was no adequate remedy at law, equity extended
its jurisdiction to restrain such trespasses. POMEROY, EQ. Jun.
§ 1896-1901; LANGDELL, EQ. JUR. pp. 30-31. It seems that irrep-
arability of injury was not a requisite for an injunction to stay
waste, while that is the very basis of equity's jurisdiction to
restrain trespass. This distinction still exists and has been recog-
nized by some American courts, who assert and follow the doctrine
that where there is privity of title between the parties an injunc-
tion to stay waste is proper regardless of the irreparability of the
injury, but that as between strangers or parties claiming adversely
there is no distinction between trespass and waste and the injury
must be shown to be irreparable before an injunction will issue.
Georges Creek Coal, etc., Co. v. Detmold, 1 Johns. Ch. 371 (Md.) ;
Brugh v. Denman, 38 Ind. App. 486, 78 N. E. 349; Bringliam v.
Overstreet, 128 Ga. 447, 57 S. E. 484; Woolworth Co. v. Nelson, 204
Ala. 172, 85 So. 449; Burton v. Steverson, 91 So. 74, (Ala. 1921).
Also, an injunction to stay waste will be granted in all cases where
a legal action would lie to recover damages, while an injunction
to restrain a trespass will not be granted unless the injury is
irreparable. Haymond v. Round, 82 Neb. 598, 118 N. W. 328;
Hawley v. Clowes, 2 Johns. Ch. 122, (N. Y.). One court goes even
further in holding that an injunction to stay waste may issue even
though the waste is so insignificant that there could be no recov-
ery of damages at law. Duvall v. Waters, 1 Bland. 569, (Md.), 18
Am. Dec. 350. An injunction to stay waste will be granted almost
as a matter of course. Markeliam v. Howell, 33 Ga. 508; Smith v.
Rome, 19 Ga. 89, 63 Am. Dec. 298. So far as the writer has been
able to discover, West Virginia is the only American jurisdiction
in which this point has been in question to adopt the view that as
between landlord and tenant, or reversioner and tenant in pos-
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session, equity will not give relief unless the injury is substantial
and irreparable. -J. D. D.
WILLS-DEVISE on BEQUEST FOR LIFE WITH POWER OF CONTROL
on DsivOsltION.-The testator by the residuary clause of his will,
gave to his wife "all the residue of my personal property, consist-
ing in money, credits or bonds to her for her own individual use
during her lifetime and at her death after paying all her just debts
and funeral expenses the residue, if any be left, to be divided
equally among my four children." The wife in her bill against
the executor, inter alia, asks the court to construe this clause.
Held, the wife takes the property absolutely. Blake v. Blake, 115
S. E. 794, (W. Va. 1923).
Conceding that the language in the foregoing clause is such as
to confer upon the wife an absolute power of disposal, the question
of law presented- is as to what effect the added power will have
upon the life estate previously created by express language and
further as to whether a gift over in such a case is well limited.
The general rule is universally recognized and uncontroverted
that where there is a perfectly general devise and the quantum of
the estate can be determined only by implication, an added abso-
lute power of disposal will pass the fee or absolute property.
Borden v. Downey, 35 N. J. L. 74; Jackson v. Robins, 16 Johns.
537, (N. Y.); Burwell v. Anderson, 3 Leigh. 348, (Va.); Note, 6
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1186; Note, 17 Am. & Eng. Ann Cas. 480.
Except in a few jurisdictions there is a well established exception
to the above stated general rule to the effect that where a life
estate is expressly limited to the first taker an added power of
disposal will not elevate the life estate previously created to a fee
or absolute property, nor render subsequent limitations over void.
Welsh v. Woodbury, 144 Mass. 542, 11 N. E. 762; Kirkpatrick v.
Kirkpatrick, 197 Ill. 144, 64 N. E. 267; Burleigh v. Clough, 52 N.
H. 267; Stuart v. Walker, 72 Me. 145. The cases so holding treat
the power of disposal not as property but as mere authority which
the life tenant may or may not exercise as he pleases. In Jackson
v. Robins, supra, the court said that a will should, if possible, be
construed according to the intent of the testator and the power
bestowed should be treated as a power and not as property in order
to give effect to the limitation over. In Stuart v. Walker, supra,
the court said that there was nothing inconsistent in these three
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